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On a hot afternoon in October, 1947, a brawl erupted on the
streets of the Brakpan Municipal Location outside the
superintendent's office. Almost immediately, the location
superintendent and an Advisory Board member who were standing by
separated the two pugilists.1 Now in themselves, there was
nothing remarkable about brawls in this East Rand location;
indeed, street violence had been part and parcel of daily life in
the location since its establishment in 1927. The distinguishing
features of this particular fight, however, and that which marked
it out as unique, were the identities of the two protagonists.
Unlike the regular brawl, usually fought out between visiting
miners and local residents, the men were two prominent Brakpan
residents, Vir- F.J. Language, municipal manager of Non-European
Affairs in Brakpan and Mr David Wilcox Bopape, local Advisory
Board representative, secretary of the Anti-Pass Campaign of 1943
and 1944 and one of the location's leading communists.2 Further,
as a consequence, unlike most other location fisticuffs, this
matter was to be elevated from the dusty location streets and
adjudicated in the more rarified atmosphere of the magistrates
and supreme courts. It was also an affair which reverberated far
beyond this small town. It was the cause of some consternation to
the central government Native Affairs Department which was intent
on implementing a reformist programme of "native administration"
and thus concerned to avoid any actions that might jeopardise
this project.
Yet, despite the tremors set off in the corridors of power, and
the fears stirred within the local white community, the surface
of the Brakpan racial and social order remained essentially
undisturbed. The fight, however, did signify a shift in the
decade - long struggle for control of the location. The local
non-European Affairs Department, under the leadership of Language
1 Brakpan Herald, 2 April, 1948
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gained the upper hand and proceeded to enforce a rationalized and
harsh system of location controls, measures, which in their
severity anticipated^much of the urban apartheid programme of the
new government which came into power a year later. From this time
too, the popular protest movement in the location, under the
leadership of Bopape subsided briefly into a state of dormancy,
only to be ignited during the country—wide mass political
mobilisation of 1950,
The aim of this paper is to explore the history of the antagonism
between the two men. While the story of a clash between a white
official and black leader in South Africa of the 1940s is of
immense social and psychological interest, it also illustrates
wider aspects of urban "native" policy and black political
consciousness and organisation in the decade which preceded
apartheid. In doing so, it points to some of the continuities
between the segregationist world of the Smuts administration and
the urban apartheid order constructed by its successor, the
Nationalist government, as well as some of the currents which fed
into the African mass political culture of the following decade.
The paper also aims to point to some of the lacunae in the
existing literature about state policy and African political
struggles in the 1940s. Most commentators of the period have
examined the radical reappraisals of the "urban native" question
in governing circles between 1940 and 1942 and 1946 and 1948 and
the new element of flexibility in the debates manifested in the
greater influence of the Native Representative Council (NRC) and
in the various state departmental commissions of inquiry into the
conditions of urban Africans.3 Nevertheless, as most writers
note, despite these portents of reform and the prime ministers'
own momentary disavowal of segregation of 1942, the Smuts
government's urban "native policy" was characterised -by
vacillation, eclecticism and uncertainty. No resolute action,
either in the implementation of the recommendations of the
commissions of inquiry or in providing the means with which to
house the burgeoning urban African population emanated from the
government. As a consequence, slumdom, intense overcrowding,
squatting and periodic outbursts of worker and popular militancy
were the characteristic features of the larger urban centres in
the decade. In many accounts, various explanations for the
government's irresolution and its tendency to ricochet between
reform and repression have been advanced. Factors such as
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financial stringency, bureaucratic: inefficiency, divisions within
the Department of Native Affairs and reflexive responses to
Malanite racialist electioneering in 1943 and 1946, for example,
have been forwarded by liberal scholars.4 Materialist analyses on
the other hand, point to underlying structural features such as
the conflicting and irreconcilable labour demands of mining and
manufacturing capital. The government they argue, was unable to
act decisively, trapped as it was between mining capital's demand
for the retention of a migratory labour system and
manufacturing's call for the "stabilisation of a permanently
urbanised African proletariat." 5 Despite the differences in
interpretation, the central government's Department of Native
Affairs emerges in the literature as a vacillating and effete
institution lacking in the resolve and resources to deal with the
massive social consequences of African urbanisation. What is
lacking in most accounts, however, is a glimpse into the day-to-
day functioning of "urban native" administration, the major
burden of which fell squarely on the shoulders of the local
authorities. It is suggested that by looking more closely at one
local state's dealings with the crises of urbanisation and
popular struggles and at its relationship with the Department of
Native Affairs, a more complex and nuanced view of the crises of
urban management and of the evolution of "urban native" policy in
this decade begins to emerge.. This and other recent studies
demonstrate how, in the absence of coherent state policy
direction or initiative, local authorities tended to respond to
the urban crises with ad hoc and piecemeal measures which, on
occasion, ran counter to government policy and to the demands of
an increasingly assertive urban African population.6
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The paper also attempts to address a second gap in the gene rail-
literature, that, of the nature and dynamics of the mobilisation
of urban Africans in the 1940s. Until recently, the decade of the
1940s has been viewed as the dress rehearsal for the mass
protests of the 1950s; the spontaneous outbursts in locations,
factory floors and squatter camps is viewed merely as the prelude
to the ANC - led campaigns of the following decade and the major
organisations of the day. Little is known of the precise
mechanics of the struggles, their local quality and character, of
the roles of tenant and resident organisations such as Vigilance
Associations, Advisory Boards and teachers associations in
contributing to political consciousness.? This paper cannot hope
to address all these gaps, but it is suggested that by focussing
more closely on the personalities, social backgrounds and worlds
of the chief actors in this story, we ars afTorded a unique
opportunity of peering more closely at one urban African
community, its struggles against evolving and ever-refining forms
of control and at the role of the state and local state officials
in this important period of transition and flux. It shows how the
Brakpan local authority in the 1940s was considerably closer to
the more repressive Stallardist position than the central state
department and thus, gave the local African inhabitants a
foretaste of the subsequent urban apartheid forms of urban
controls.
Dr Francis Joseph Language (1910-1981)
Francis (Frank) Language was born on a farm in the Lydenburg
district in 1910. He was the oldest son of a family of six
children. Like many rural Afrikaans-speaking families of the
period, his was a family of "Bloedsappe", a legacy which the
young Language would soon discard. Language matriculated in 1930
from the local school and went to the University of Stellenbosch
to study a Bachelor of Arts in anthropology and African languages
in 1933 and graduated two years later with distinction. From May
1934 to December 1936, he interrupted his studies and worked as a
clerk in the Pretoria office of the Department, of Native Affairs,
where he was first introduced to the problems associated with
urban "native administration." In 1937, he returned to his alma
mater to continue with his studies in anthropology arid to take up
a position as lecturer in that department. Once again, he
demonstrated his academic excellence and at th^ end of that year,
Institute Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand
(UW), 28 October, 1985
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he was awarded a masters degree with distinction. Language was
awarded a Webb stipend by the National Research Board in 1938 and
began his research for his doctoral thesis which he completed in
194.1,, It was an influential work, and was subsequently published
under the title of "Stamregering by Thlaping".8 His years at
Stellensbosch were extremely formative, a time when the
foundations of his political thought were laid. His
anthropological studies were crucial in shaping his political
vision and in developing his understanding of the great "native
question" of the day. This background, and his years living and
researching amongst the Thlaping were seminal in "the evolution of
his thinking about the origins of, and solutions to the massive
social and political problems which had resulted from African
proletarianisation and the erosion of the economic bases of the
"reserves". It was in this period that he became conscious of the
need to combat "detribalisation" and of the value of
anthropological study to achieve this end.9 In the Stellenbosch
of the .1930s, Language was also introduced to the flourishing
Afrikaner nationalist movement amongst students and intellectuals
and to the ideals of Christian Nationalism which was to serve as
the bedrock of his thought. It was here too that he was inspired
to join the populist extra parliamentary Afrikaner movement, the
Ossewa Brandwag, an organisation committed broadly to the
maintenance of Afrikaner values, the nurturing of patriotism and
group pride and the vigorous defence of the "Afrikaner way of
life"JLO It is unclear though how he responded to its increasingly
paramilitary and neo-fascist character.
He was educated in a climate when Afrikaner students and
intellectuals had become increasingly conscious of the
considerably more sophisticated thinking of "die 1iberalistiese
en negrofilistiese seksie cinder ons land se intellegentsisisa" on
the "native question" and'of the need for Afrikaner intellectuals
to equip themselves intellectually to take on the hegemonic
English race - relations discourse. In an issue of the Afrikaanse
Nasionale Jeugbeweging journal, Wapenskou of 1943, for example,
the editorial urged Afrikaners to engage in scientific research
8 This account has been stitched together from the
following sources: H. Sapire, interview with Mrs F.J.
Language, Pretoria, August, 1988; "Brakpan Verloor
Groot Deskundige" in Springs and Brakpan Advertiser. 15
January, 1960; C.J. Nel, "Gedenks: F.J. Language" in
Tydskrif vir Rasse Aanqeleenthede, vol 32, no.4, 19B1
9 See his article, "Naturellevraagstuk by Uitneemendheid
F'robleem van die Blanke" in Die Vaderland, 13 March,
1936
10 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (Cape
Town, 1988), p. 333
into the "native question" and a thorough immersion in
ethnological study to equip them with an understanding of the
contemporary problems.11 This was an important period of
Afrikaner intellectual ferment and the period in which the
"apartheid" concept originated among Afrikaner intellectuals who
wanted "vertical" separation of the races.12 The culmination of
these various influences in Language's thinking are evident in a
pamphlet, co-written with F'.J. Coerze and Professor B.I.C. van
Eeden, both of whom, together with Language were to become
influential "visionaries" of SA6RA.13 The authors assert the
importance of Christian Nationalism as the basis of the ethical
life of Afrikaners; the god-ordained nature of the separation of
races (.race apartheid); the unique role of the Afrikaner in South
Africa and the desirability of a radical and just policy of total
apartheid. They castigate Afrikaans speakers for their ignorance
about "native tribes" and about the total extent of the "native
question", a problem which needed to be redressed if the
Afrikaner was to play their rightful role in the resolution of
the race issue. Their article points to the disruption of
traditional African social structures and to the solvent effects
of urbanisation and economic integration upon traditional social
restraints. This, they opine, had resulted in a "new spirit of
irresponsible individualism and egocentricism" amongst Africans.
Stripped of the restraints of traditional society, urbanised
Africans had absorbed the worst of white values and had come to
lead lives of degeneracy and dissipation in the cities. Moreover,
unrestrained urbanisation and "economic integration" had brought
about the evil of "blood mixing". The moral and practical
solution they offer is the reconstruction of the "original"
tribal order and a total separation between white and "natives"
in all areas of life. These, crudely summarised, were to remain
the essential guiding principles of Language's thinking. Despite
his confrontation with the realities of administering an African
community in one of the most populous and industrialised urban
regions in the 1940s, he, together with other SABRA
11 "Die Naturellevraagstuk en die Afrikaner Student" in
Wapenskou, April, 1943. For a discussion of the
relationship of "English" anthropological study and
state policy, see S. Dubow, "Race, Civilization and
Culture: The Elaboration of Segregationist Discourse in
the Inter—War Years" in S. Marks and S. Trapido
(eds.),The Politics of Race. Class and Nationalism in
Twentieth Century South Africa (London, 1987), pp.71-94
12 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa, p 356.
13 F'.J. Coerze, F.J. Language and B.I.C. van Eeden, "Die
Oplossing van die Naturelievraagstuk in Suid Afrika:
Wenke Qreenkomstig die Afrikanerstandpunt van
Apartheid" (Johannesburg, 1943)
"visionaries", would continue to call for the urgent
resuscitation of the ailing reserve economies as a precondition
for effective "vertical" separation of the races and to chide the
governments of the day for their laggardness in effecting this.
This idealistic or "visionary" strain in his thinking which
demanded total territorial segregation, was to run counter not
only to that of the Department of Native Affairs of the Smuts
administration, but later, to that of the first Nationalist
Native Affairs minister, Verwoerd,14
Language, however was not content to remain aloof from what he
saw as the great challenges of the day, and in 1943, applied for
the job of Manager of Non-European Affairs advertised by the East
Rand municipality of Brakpan. Of all the applicants for this
post, Language proved to be the most eminent. With his fluency in
African languages and expertise in "native" affairs and
"psychology", he was regarded as the ideal candidate. This was a
new post created by the Brakpan Municipality and great hopes were
invested in Dr Language. In the preceding four years, the
administration of the local African populace was in a state of
total disarray. The abolition of pass controls in the early
phases of the war, the relaxation of the local resident permit
system since 1938 and the impoverishment in the reserves had
resulted in the flooding of Africans to the East Rand. The
previous superintendent had been unable to prevent "an
extraordinary and unprecedented" flow of Africans from nearby
farms, surrounding gold mines and reserves who settled in the
municipal location and shacks on the peri-urban plots and small
farms on the periphery of the town. By the mid-1940s, the
permanently settled African population of Brakpan had grown to
over 16 000. (This figure excludes the 30 000 odd African miners
living in compounds on the nearby mines.) The municipal location
accommodated between a and 10 000 of these people. The remainder
lived as squatters on the plots and in backyard hovels in the
white town.15 Not only did. this influx exacerbate an already
acute housing shortage, but the town's economy proved to be
singularly incapable of providing employment to the newcomers.
Although situated in the heart of this industrialised region,
Brakpan was one of the smaller centres with an underdeveloped
industrial and commercial sector. Moreover, because of the
absence of an adequate industrial infrastructure, many existing
14 For a discussion of the "purist" strain within SABRA,
see J. Lasar, "Verwoerd versus the Visionaries: The
South African Bureau of Racial Affairs and Apartheid,
1948 — 1961", paper presented to the "South Africa in
the 1950s" conference, University of Oxford, September,
1987
15 CAD: Brakpan Municipal Records (BMR) N3/57 Report of
• the Manager of Non-European Affairs, 24 January, 1943
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employers relocated their enterprises to areas with local
authorities more solicitous to the needs of manufacturing, While
some Africans employees followed their employers, thE> closing
down of such outfits inevitably left unemployed Africans in their
wake.16 The new numbers of rural immigrants thus also
contributed to high levels of unemployment. In conditions of
unemployment, the one economic activity which did flourish was
that of beer brewing and liquor smuggling, a trade which grew to
mammoth proportions.17 Conditions in the location itself were
appalling; households doubled up and the additional numbers
placed immense strains on all urban amenities. Moreover, the-
administration of the location was being conducted at tremendous
cost to this rather impecunious local authority. The native
revenue account showed a deficit, a factor due in large part to
'the hundreds of residents in arre&rB in their rents. Most
alarming for the municipality, was the increasingly militant
assertions of discontent from location residents and the
appearance in the location, for the first time ever, of effective
political organisation.18 The total breakdown of controls decided
the council in 1942 that it was necessary to overhaul the entire
system of location administration. Investigations into the matter
revealed to them that the existing superintendent had been
derelict in his' duties, in suppressing the liquor trade, in
collecting outstanding rents, in enforcing the residential
permit system and in monitoring political activity. Although this
official was held to be incompetent, it was realised that the
municipality lacked the appropriate bureaucratic and
administrative machinery to govern its local African population.
During this time the town clerk, together with subordinates,
including the location superintendent were responsible for the
supervision of the municipal compound, location and beerhall and
for the inspection of the smallholdings for unauthorised African
occupation. Biven the "increasing complexity" of "native
administration", it was decided to follow the direction of the
larger Reef municipalities and to create a municipal non-European
Affairs Department and to appoint a Manager of Non-European
Affairs to co-ordinate the duties and responsibilities of ruling
this increasingly restive African population. The manager's task
would be to enforce the Native (Urban Areas) _Ac_t (JL923J. and to
16 Brakpan Municipal Archives (BMA): Bi'lR 14/7/7 Undated
letter to the Town Clerk from the Brakpan Location
Joint Organisations Committee U-^rca. September, 1947)
17 CAD:BMR N3/57 Minutes of the Meeting of the Location
Sub-Committee, 29 March, 1943
18 For a detailed discussion of sqcio—economic conditions
in the location, see H. Sapire, "African Urbanisation
and Struggles Against Municipal Controls in Brakpan,
1920 - 1958", Ph.D thesis, UW, 1989
establish both the new department and a council of sub-committee
of "experts".19
Language left the Cape to take up this challenge in 1943. The
Brakpan in which he found himself, was, as today, one of the
poorer arid drabber towns of the East Rand. Its white population
were mainly miners and artisans living in three small suburbs or
on the plots and smallholdings on the edges of the town. Unlike
some of the larger East Rand towns, the commercial and industrial
sector was a small and socially insignificant force in civic
life. It thus lacked the social and cultural pretensions., of the
petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie with their demands for liberal
improved social conditions for the African population. Despite
strenuous efforts, it had been impossible to muster sufficient
support to establish a Joint Council of Europeans .and Non-
Europeans in the town. Race relations were harsh; the white
inhabitants had a strong sense of the threat posed to their
privileged and protected positions by African urbanisation and by
their acquisition of industrial skills. As was the case in most
towns, the location and the white town were totally cut off from
one another. A high fence surrounded the location and interaction
between the two societies was restricted to rigid master-servant
relationships. It was probably only on the plots and small towns
that, there was a greater degree of social intimacy between the
two races, This social environment, as much as his own political
credo was to inform Language's "native" policies in Brakpan.
Although it was tip become a nationalist stronghold in later years
and to have a nationalist minority in the town council, when
Language first arrived, Brakpan was a United Party parliamentary
seat and the town was English dominated.20 Indeed, one of the
major social tensions of these years was that which existed
between the English and Afrikaner townsfolk. Yet, Language and
his wife were able to find likeminded people and fellow Afrikaans
speakers who similarly felt stifled by the Englishness of the
town. Amongst their close family friends was Balthazar John
Vorster who was later to become prime minister: Language was also
to become a staunch church elder of the NGK and a voluntary
member of the Springs shooting commando. Despite some initial
social alienation, 21 as the Afrikaans speaking population grew
in size and confidence, and as he won the respect and total
support of his colleagues on the town council, he was to become
.1.9 CADrBMR B3/57 Minutes of the Meeting of the Town
Council, 26 April, 1943
20 See F.J. Nothling, "The Story of Brakpan", undated,
unpublished manuscript
21 H. Sapire, interview with Mrs F.J. Language, Pretoria,
August, 1988
one of the •foremost citizens of the town. Indeed, from the moment
of his arrival, Language applied himself energetically to the
tasks before him.
As has been mentioned, one of the reasons for the creation of the
new post of manager1 and the new department of non -•- E'jrapoan
Affairs was the rumblings of political activity within the
location and the growth of the Communist Party of South Africa.
(CPSA). By 1943, the Brakpan Location 'was the scene of regular
political meetings, addressed by local and national political
figures, who, because of the laxity of the location controls,
enjoyed free access to the location. One of the figures at the
centre of these developments within the local location was David
Wilcox Bopape the man who would become Language's chief
antagonist over the next decade. It is thus to Bopape that this
paper now turns.
David wilcox Bopape (1915 - )22
Like Language, Bopape was Transvaal born. He was one of three
children of a labour tenant family living on a farm in the
Pietersburg district. At the time of his birth, 22 September,
1915, his father was away in wat—torn Europe with the "native
contingent". Although the Bopape family lived in conditions not
dissimilar to other rural black cultivators, his social origins
were considerably more patrician than many of his counterparts in
the Area. His grandfather was a minister of religion and owner of
land in the area and like many contemporary prosperous African
farmers, his family valued education as a prised commodity. When
his father returned to the farm after the war, his family left
the farm to live with his grandfather. After completing his
standard six at. Kransenstein Mission School in 1932, Bopape went
to Dison (?) College near Middelburg where he passed his junior
certificate and received training as a school teacher. Between
1933 and 1938, Bopape worked as a school teacher in Tzaneen and
Middelburg. It was in these years that he joined the Transvaal
African Teachers Association (TATA) an organisation which was to
play a significant role in the shaping of his political
consc iousness.
This account of Bopape's early life has been drawn from
various interviews conducted with him over the last few
years. See D. Cachalia, interview with David Bop«pe,
Johannesburg, 31 May, 1932 (Records of the South
African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRFO, UW; H.
Sapire and A. Cobbley, interview with D. Bopape,
Johannesburg, August, 1983; H. Sapire, interview with
D. Bopape, Johannesburg, April, .1988 and P. Delias,
interview with D. Bopape (date?)
In 1938, Bopape left the northern Transvaal for the Reef. He had
been appointed as a teacher at the Berlin Mission School in the
Brakpan Municipal Location. In Brakpan, he found himself in one
of the smaller, more squalid Reef locations. Although the Brakpan
location of the 1930s housed a cowed and politically apathetic
population, the war years were to usher in a new political
radicalism, fuelled by massive urbanisation, the experience of
war time privations and by the stirring into action of the CPSA
and the African National Congress. (ANC)23 In his first year in
Brakpan, 1939, it appears that his energies were absorbed in
completing his matric while teaching at the school. It was
probably in the next three years he became increasingly active in
community life. He became chairperson of the Lawn tennis
Association, secretary of the Location Child and social Welfare
Society, Secretary of the Vigilance Association and "Boys Club"
and an elected Advisory Board member. It is probably not
surprising that he should have risen to a position of social
prominence. For apart from his charisma and energy, testified to
by all informants, as a school teacher, he occupied a position of
great social prestige. In the Brakpan Location, as in other
underprivileged communities where educated people were essential
to explain and interpret the various regulations governing their
lives and to mediate between the community and white officialdom,
teachers occupied a natural position of leadership. It was also
the case that the absence of clerical work for Africans in the
town and stringent controls on petty entrepreneurship, the
educated and relatively more prosperous elite were school
teachers. This was reflected in the composition of the Advisory
Baord; throughout the. 1940s and 1950s, this institution was
virtually run by the local teachers.
It was though his activities in TATA, and in its campaigns for
higher salaries for teachers that Bopape was first introduced to
mass politics and to wider political currents within black
society. In the TATA "blanket campaign" of 1941, Bopape
participated in teachers' demonstrations in the streets of
Johannesburg.24 In this year too, Bopape first came into contact
with the CPSA. He apparently attended a meeting in the Gandhi
Hall in Johannesburg and was inspired by the speeches and by the
dynamism of the organisation. In these years, the CPSA had
certainly made a dramatic recovery from its pre-war lethargy and
through its involvement in trade union work amongst Indian and
African workers, it participation in white municipal elections
and in its rapprochement with the ANC, had begun to extend its
23 H. Sapire, "The Stay-Away of the Brakpan Location,
August, 1944" in B. Bozzoli (ed.) Class. Community and
Conflict: South African Perspectives (Johannesburg,
1987)
24 T. Lodge, Black Politics, p. 132
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influence. African membership soared, and the CPSA began to play
an increasingly important role in organising location communities
in areas like the East Rand around the immediate, material
struggles of its inhabitants. 25 The latter aspect of their
strategy particularly attracted Bopape and he was to become a Key
exponent of this policy as a member of the Brakpan CPSA branch
and of the East Rand District Committee of the F'arty. His
membership of the Party, however, did not prevent him from
joining the local ANC branch in the following year or from
becoming a founder member of the Youth League in 1944. Bopape
succeeded in balancing these two positions, and indeed, in the
joint CPSA-ANC anti -pass campaigns of 1943 -1944, united them in
his person as secretary of the Anti-Pass Council which had
emerged in response to the State's crackdown on pass offenders.
Yet, while he could comfortably reconcile his membership of both
organisations, he was regarded with some suspicion by some of his
ANC colleagues, particularly by Youth League?; with their
antipathy to communism and to the CPSA's advocation of using
"dummy institutions" such as Advisory Boards as a means of
establishing footholds in urban African locations. This was a
strategy employed to great effect in the Brakpan Location and in
no small way, a tribute to the persuasiveness and dynamism of
Bopape and some of bis fellow CPSA colleagues in the location.
The Meeting of the Two Men
Under the influence of a newer, more dynamic generation of
location leaders, the Advisory Board had become an active force
in the location. Community leaders used the institution as a
means communicating grievances to town council, of holding it
accountable to the residents and of mobilising the local
community around issues which affected their daily lives. Many of
these issues revolved around the basic survival struggles in
which most urban Africans were engaged in these years. The battle
to stretch wages to meet soaring food, shelter and transport
costs were issues which were taken up by the communist -
dominated Board as were the grievances related to some of the
more petty controls embodied in the location regulations. The
Advisory Board had also become a platform for the expression of
wider political ideals, both in the local and national sense.
Locally, it but it became a vehicle for the expression of ideals
for greater representation and responsibility for Africans in
urban affairs. The Board continually called for the establishment
of their "own treasury" and for African representation on ths
town council. It was precisely these sorts of demands, that is
25 Inkululeko, 30 October, 1944; T. Lodge, "Class
Conflict, Community Struggles and Patriotic Unity: The
Communist Party of South Africa. During the Second World
War", paper presented to the African Studies Institute
Seminar, UW, October, 1985.,
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the call for wider political rights within the urban area which
were viewed by Language as one of the most dangerous consequences
of the government allowing unrestrained urbanisation and
"economic integration".26 The fact that these demands were being
made by CPSA members made the situation all the more ominous for
him. Space does not allow for a more detailed account of the
activities of the Advisory Board and of the Vigilance Association
which worked together in local struggles for betterment and
against some of the more arbitrary and petty restrictions of
location life. Suffice it to say, by the early 1940s, unlike
their predecessors which had represented the narrow, sectional
interests of the location's petty bourgeoisie, these institutions
achieved a genuinely popular following.27 Their commitment to the
parochial, daily struggles of residents, moreover, did much to
expand the local following of the CPSA. By the early 1940s, as a
result, Brakpan had become one of the most active CPSA centres on
the East Rand.28
In a situation in which location organisations were calling for
greater community participation in the running of the location,
the announcement that a new streamlined "native affairs"
department headed by a known Nationalist Party and OB member was
to be installed, was the cause of alarm. The residents had held
the location's first superintendent, Mr Gould in affection and
had become accustomed to the even more relaxed atmosphere under
the ineffectual administration of his successor, Mr Abrahams in
the early war years.
Language's first actions as manager confirmed all of their fears.
His period of service opened in mid-1943 with tighter influx
controls, the enforcement of the visitors permit system, an
increase in lodgers fees and the harassment of rent defaulters.
Beer raids were reintroduced and police spies infiltrated all
political meetings.29 It is small wonder then that the meeting of
"welcome" to Language in November was seised as an opportunity to
voice the discontent and resentment at these changes and to
reassert the demand for representation on the council. It was at
this meeting, that Bopape, who had been elected by the residents
to address the meeting, first came to Language's notice. While
most residents were of the view that Bopape was merely forwarding.
26 CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 "Native Unrest in the Brakpan
Location - Confidential Report"
27 See H. Sapire, "African Urbanisation", chapters 3 and 4
28 T. Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 26 - 29
29 Inkululeko, 4 March, 1944; CAD:BMR S37 Location
Superintendent to the Manager of Non-European Affairs,
7 September, 1945
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their grievances, Language felt that Bopape's speech wat
"antagonistic" and "inflammatory", He became convinced in an
instant that Bopape's continued presence in the location posed a
profound threat "to good government in the location," 30
If members of the town council had any doubts about the danger of
Bopape's presence in the location, these were laid to rest by the
tumultuous local response to the Anti-Pass Campaign in June and
July of the following year. Throughout these months, in defiance
of a ban on "social gatherings", regular meetings were held in
the location addressed by local ANC and CPSA activists and by
national figures such as Gana Makabeni, Edwin Mofutsanyana and
C.S, Ramohanoe.31 It was in these circumstances that the council
agreed with Language's proposal to have Bopape dismissed from his
post as the first step towards forcing him out of the location
altogether. Despite careful surveillance of political meetings,
Language clearly did not realise either the extent of Bopape's
following or that of popular dissatisfaction with his regime. For
in the wake of the dismissal, he and the council were taken
completely by surprise by a schools boycott and total stay away
from work in protest against the dismissal was organised by the
Vigilance Association and elected Advisory Board members in July
and August of that year. 32 After hours of negotiating with the
council, the Vigilance Association and Advisory Board agreed to
call off the strike; in return, the council undertook to
investigate the strike demands and grievances of the residents.
Amongst the demands were the reinstatement of Bopape in his post
as teacher and the dismissal of Dr Language from his.
Although the resolution of disputes and problems in locations was
regarded by the Department of Native Affairs • as the domestic
concern of individual municipalities, this incident was one which
seriously disconcerted them. Not only had the NRC adjourned on
the day of the strike, but over the following few weeks and
months, the Department was inundated with petitions and letters
from the Vigilance Association protesting against the council's
"betrtayal" of promises look into their grievances and to
investigate Language's conduct and the reinstatement of Bopape.
Language on the other hand appealed to the Minister of Native
30 BMA:BMR 14/1/1 Minutes of the Meeting of the Town
Council, 26 November, .1943
31 CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 Report o.f the Superintendent of
the Brakpan Location: Native Unrest in the Location
(circa August, 1944); CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 Report of
Meeting Held in the Brakpan Location Shop Square, 28
June, 1944; T. Lodge, "Class Conflict"
32 For a detailed discussion of these events, see H.
Sapire "The Stay Away"
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Affairs to take action against Bopape and his "clique of
malcontents." 33 The Native Afffairs Commissioner stationed in
Benoni was thus instructed to launch a full-scale enquiry into
the events and allegations. After extensive discussions with both
the location representatives and the council, the Native
Commissioner acknowledged that Language's action had been the
cause of widespread anger. Nevertheless, he agreed with the
council's view that Bopape and "his lieutenants" exercised a
tyranny over an essentially law-abiding, peaceful community and
that they had incited them to acts of defiance for reasons of
political expediency. However, the Department concluded, no good
purpose would be served by taking punitive action against
Language as this would merely fuel the propaganda of the location
organisations.34
The outcome of the enquiries and the failure to address any of
their grievances did little to assuage the resentment of location
leadership. The involvement and visibility of the CPSA in the
stay away and the support shown for their cause in the pages of
Inkululeko had the effect of enhancing, rather than diminishing
the prestige of the Party, a factor which was demonstrated in the
Board elections for 1945. In this election, the communist
members, including Bopape swept the polls. Further, the council's
assertion that the CPSA enjoyed the support of only a fraction of
the location, was contradicted by the total support shown for the
bus boycott organised by this communist - led Board.35 Thus,
apart from the tasks of imposing effective influx controls and
eradicating the deficit of the Native Revenue Account, Language
set himself the task of crushing political activity. In all
projects, he was to meet the implacable opposition of the
residents, and in each project, the enmity of' David Bopape.
The years of conflict between, these two men were portentous ones
nationally. At this time, the government grappled to formulate a
workable urban "native" policy and to come to terms with the
realities of massive and rapid proletarianisation. After the
crack-down on passes in 1944 and the promulgation of the amended
Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1945, the Government once again
seemed to be changing direction. The worsening of the political
situation in 1946, the year of the massive African mine workers
strike, the disbanding of the (NRC) and the indications that the
33 CAD:NTS 4320 177/313 Town Clerk to the Secretary for
Native Affairs, 12 February, 1945; Brakpan Herald. 5
November, 1945
34 CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 Secretary for Native Affairs to
the Native Commissioner, Benoni, 22 July, 1944
35 BMA:BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory
Board, 14 December, 1946; Inkululeko. 4 April, 1946
militant tendency in African political opposition to the state
was gathering momentum, had led to the appointment of the Native
Laws Commission of Enquiry under the chairmanship of the former
Minister of Native Affairs, H.A. Fagan. This commission had been
charged with the investigation of far reaching reformulation of
"native policy".36 On the other hand, these years saw the
refinement of an alternative policy, to be embodied in the Sauer
document which was to serve as th National F'arty's election
manifesto in 1948. This policy was premised on the reversal of
African urbanisation and total segregation. It was in the latter
camp that Language fell. The manifest inability of the state to
deal with the urban growth, slums, poverty and shanty towns was
criticised heavily by Language both in his testimony to the Fagan
Commission and in his correspondence with the Department. His
diagnosis of the problems and his proposal for their eradication
corresponded closely with the ideas articulated in the Sauer
Report. As Language saw it, the relaxation of pass laws and
influx controls during the war years and the government's erratic
reapplication of such measures thereafter, had resulted in the
creation of an inordinately large urban African population. He
also felt that the overlapping jurisdictions of the various
branches of state responsible for "native administration"
hindered effective administration. He continually called for the
centralisation and rationalisation ; he believed that the Smuts
Government was moving towards decentralisation, which would
presage the abandonment of influx controls and thus segregation
altogether. He also believed that the state should assume
responsibility for African housing and that by not assuming this
responsibility, it was contradicting its own avowed intentions of
stabilising the urban population. He suggested that the
government would better expend its energies in resurrecting the
reserve economies and redirecting African economic, social and
political aspirations there. To this end, he believed that
tighter influx controls were essential.37
It was these ideas which informed Language's administrative
practice in Brakpan from 1944 to 1948. While the measures he
introduced were invariably justified on humanitarian grounds,
they elicited unprecedented opposition from the African
population which believed that they were introduced with a marked
absence of sympathy. The Department of Native Affairs, similarly
was similarly disconcerted by the zeal with which Language went
about his tasks. It was felt that his inflexibility at a time of
reassessment of national policy was impolitic and that his
36 D. Hindson, Pass Controls, pp. 52 - 61
37 Records of the SAIRR, UW : Miscellaneous Files AD 1756.
Evidence submitted to the Native Laws Commission of
Enquiry (FABAN), 1947 : Minutes of Evidence of F.J.
Language.
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actions would antagonise Africans at precisely the time that
their goodwill ought to be cultivated.
These years were also of considerable moment within African
political circles. The advances made by the CPSA in the townships
of the Ei'ast Rand have already been alluded to. The ANC too had
undergone significant shifts in the war years, and with the
national organisation increasingly under the dominance of a
younger generation of leaders who saw the political potential of
mass based politics, it began to adopt an increasingly sensitive
approach to the problems and views of the mass of urban Africans.
However, despite the greater receptiveness to the social problems
in the locations and squatter camps in the war years, they never
displayed the social radicalism of the CF'SA. The national
leadership remained wary and held back from mass organisation and
the shifts were more apparent on the ideological level as for
example in the adoption of a Charter of Rights modelled on the
Atlantic Charter calling for universal suffrage and increased
state responsibility for social welfare. 38 In Brakpah, though
the ANC branch began to develop a more proletarian following.
This was due in no small way to the calibre of local CPSA-ANC
leadership and their accessible political style. Indeed, as so
many activists were members of both, the leadership of the two
political organisations in the location were, in later years,
virtually indistinguishable. Inkululeko. The Guardian and other
Communist Party pamphlets were distributed at ANC meetings, while
CPSA meetings resounded with the cries of "Mayibuye Afrika".39 In
1943, a local Women's League had been formed and the ANC, CPSA,
Vigilance Association and Advisory Board leaders worked together
in local campaigns. Yet, it was the CPSA which really enjoyed the
higher profile in the location due to its championing- of local
disputes and causes. The East Rand branch of the Party was also
considerably more responsive to local developments and struggles,
than were any of provincial or national ANC structures. It was
thus the Party, rather than the ANC which became thorn in the
side of the local administration and thus one of its chief
obsessions. .
The following section of the paper concerns itself with
Language's efforts to tighten influx, residential and political
controls and the responses these elicited from the location
community and from the Department of Native Affairs.
Language's Anti-Squattinq and Permit Campaigns
Language's first area of concern, the elimination of squatting
38 P. Waishe, The Rise of African Nationalism, p. 334
39 CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 "Report of Meeting held by ANC,
Brakpan Hall, 26, June, 1944"
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need not detain us here. Suffice it to say, he endeavoured
between 1945 and 1947 to rid the plots and smallholdings in the
town's hinterland of its squatter population, estimated at 12 000
in 19413. Apart from the breakdown of controls which their very
presence signified,, the militant squatter movements in Benoni,
Johannesburg and Albsrton haunted Language. He was also mindful
of the widespread anger amongst white plotholders over the
gangsterism, shebeens and carousings of miners in shacks an the
smallholdings. Yet as in other fields of urban "native
administration" in these years, in his efforts to rid Brakpan of
its "surplus" population of squatters, he was to receive little
support from the central government. To make matters worse, the
absence of alternative accommodation for the "bona fide
employees" of the town who were living on the plots and the
reluctance of many white plotholders to expel their tenantry and
thus relinquish income in the form of rentals made Language's
efforts futile. The mass evictions instituted by his department
during 1945 and 1946 caused untold distress. The chaos caused by
homeless Africans roaming in search of shelter on the plots and
the inability of the Council to house those amongst them who were
legally entitled to municipal housing, demonstrated that until
new housing projects were embarked upon, it would be useless to
persist in enforcing expulsions. Until such time, the council was
compelled to sanction African settlement on the plats and to
accept that squatting in unpoliced and uncontrolled areas would,
remain a major form of accommodation for Africans in the Brakpan
area. It was only to be in 1948, under a government more
sympathetic to the problems of the municipality that Language's
efforts to eliminate squatting were to receive central government
support. In that year, the town was proclaimed under emergency
regulations which provided for the removal of squatter
settlements.40
A related programme which Language instituted, and one which is
of more relevance to our story, is that of the reintroduction of
the permit system. While he was forced to turn a blind eye to the
persistence of squatting, his attitude towards the large numbers
of Africans in the location who were neither employed within the
Brakpan municipal area nor employed at all, was considerably less
conciliatory. His efforts to rid the town of these people was to
be one of the factors leading to clashes with both the central
government and the local African population. The ruthlessness
with which he and his Department attempted to reduce the location
population to those who provided labour to the town led residents
to characterise his appointment and the reintroduction of the
permit system as the "opening of an era of unprecedented and
continual prosecution... of constant fear and insecurity". The
40 For a fuller discussion of Language's fight against
squatting, see H. Sapire, "African Urbanisation",
chapter 4.
12
introduction of this system, together with a local system of
controls on the influx of women led location organisations to
accuse the by-now Nationalist-dominated council of using the
location as a "testing ground for their political theories."41
Soon after his appointment in 1.943, Language was alerted to the
fact that while many of the town's bana fide employees lived as
lodgers in the location or as squatters on the plots, large
numbers of Africans living in the location houses were either
unemployed or employed in centres outside of Brakpan.42 Not only
did t.heir presence in the location hinder attempts to house all
bona fide workers in the municipal ares., but they were seen by
him as a drain on the location's finances for as a consequence of
unemployment and indigence, many residents were in arrears with
their rents. He also felt that the rising crime rate and
political volatility of the location could be explained by the
presence of unemployed "agitators" who were not entitled to
municipal accommodation. Dr Language believed that these problems
were the direct result of the council's failure to implement the
permit system in the years 1938 to 1943. In December, 1944, the
council unanimously accepted a proposal of Language to reinforce
regulation 24 (c) of the location regulations which made the
granting of a residential permit conditional upon employment in
the municipal area. According to this regulation, all permits
expired each year on 31 December and it was incumbent upon each
permit holder to reapply for the renewal of their permit before
that date. Qualification for renewal required that applicants be
employed or engaged in a "legitimate business" in the municipal
area. Only "fit and proper" married men who had paid all amounts
due to the council in fees, rents and other charges up to the
preceding November and who had not been convicted for criminal
offences were eligible for renewal. Those who failed to qualify
could be removed from the location by the council.43 After six
years in which the permit system had been held in abeyance, the
change in policy took some time to register in the minds of the
residents. The slow response, and gradual trickling in of
applications in 1945 led Language to believe that a boycott of
the permit system had been organised by the Advisory Board. This
determined him to take firm action. This perception of Language
was not altogether unfounded; as a later section in the paper
41 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Manager of Non-European Affiars to the
Town Clerk, 8 December, 1944
42 BMA:BMR 14/7/7 Report of the Manager of Non-European
Affairs, 1 March, 1945
43 BMA:BMR 13/7/7 Minutes of the Meeting of the Finances
and General Purposes Committee, 18 June, 1945; BMA:BMR
14/1/18 Manager of Non—European Affairs to the Town
Clerk, 8 March, 1946
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will demonstrate, the Council had reached deadlock in
negotiations with the Advisory Board, the Vigilance Association
and Brakpan Ratepayers Associations over other matters.44
In the following year, the council thus began to enforce the
permit system on an "extensive scale". Not surprisingly, in a
context of widespread unemployment and desperate housing
shortages across the Reef, this measure sparked off discontent.
For while the measure was originally aimed at the "undesirable"
elements and the unemployed, they threatened a much wider cross
section of location society. Many of the residents who were
subsequently prosecuted and threatened with evictions had lived
in the location for over ten years and had worked in the Brakpan
municipal area for substantial periods of time. Because of the
high levels of job insecurity, many such people had lost their
jobs in Brakpan and had found alternative employment in other
East Rand towns. The Vigilance Association secretary, Mr Pakade,
for example worked as a shop assistant in Johannesburg.45 Alfred
Nhlape, who had been retrenched from his. job as a dental mechanic
in Brakpan after 16 years of employment was re-employed outside
Brakpan. Others who found themselves in similar positions were ex
- soldiers "Who were unable to find work in Brakpan after
demobilisation. 46 The tensions and fears generated by the ever
present spectre of unemployment were greatly aggravated by the
new threat of prosection. As the residents expressed it,
"It means that the whole population of
Brakpan Location, a population of workers
lives under the constant threat of prose-
cution by ...(the) Council as soon as they
have lost their employment in Brakpan"47
It was the view of the residents that the Council had made this
situation even worse by its persistence in engaging only "Reserve
natives" in the municipal labour force, "thus further restricting
the field of employment for the unfortunate Africans who live in
the location". In the face of the threat of prosecution, many
44 BMA:BMR 14/7/7. Minutes of the Meeting of the Finances
and General Purposes Commitee, 18 June, 1945
45 H. Sapire, interview with Mr E. Pakade, Tsakane,•
January, 1985
46 BMA:BMR 14/7/7 Undated letter to the Town Council from
the Secretary of the Locations Joint Organisations
Committee, icirca November, 1947)
47 BMAsBMR 14/7/7 Undated letter to the Town Clerk from
the Secretary of the Location Joint Organisations
Committee (circa November 1947)
residents were forced to sell their houses (some houses were
privately owned) and to search for alternative housing in the
other, equally overcrowded locations of the Reef. The
vulnerability of deserted wives and widows in the urban area was
sharply underlined by the re-imposition of the regulation. No
longer attached to permit - holding men, they were now deemed
illegal residents and instructed to l&ave the location.48
Teachers were another group of residents who fell foul of the
regulation. Because of the paucity of educational institutions in
Brakpan, qualified teachers taught elsewhere on the Witwatersrand
while living in Brakpan. The council's firm stand on the
regulation compelled some to relinquish their jobs, a factor
which further inflamed the discontent of the already disaffected
teachers who found that they would have to "either face
prosecution or accept less remunerative jobs in Brakpan eg.
domestic service just in order to retain their houses."
It became evident by 1946 that the permit issue had the potential
to become explosive. In an attempt to defuse the situation, the
council summoned a residents meeting to explain the rationale for
this policy. The residents, however, were not amenable to the
council's reasoning and they remained convinced that the permit
system was yet another weapon in the segregationist arsenal. As
superintendent reported to the council, at the meeting,
"Speeches of a political nature were made and the
regulations were connected to the Pass Laws and other
discriminatory laws applied to the Natives by the
government".49
And it was here, at this meeting, that Bopape, who was chairing
the meeting, once again aroused the ire of the council. According
to the superintendent, Mr Roux, Bopape encouraged the audience
to cross-examine him. Roux reported that so hostile was the
audience and so longwinded were the speeches, that he found
himself constrained to treat the questions "broadly" in order to
prevent "disturbances". Roux's evasiveness, however, merely
served to inflame the crowd and the meeting ended in uproar, the
audience apparently roused by.Bopape's concluding words
"While you are sitting here, the Manager of Non-
European Affairs and the town council are busy
48 BMAuBMR 14/7/7 C. Joffee to the Town Clerk, 14
February, 1949
49 BMA:BMR 14/7/7 Location Superintendent to the Manager
of Non-European Affairs, 13 December, 1946
making more laws to apply to you"SO
Feeling run so high in the days following the meeting that the
council began to fear another strike if it went ahead with the
enforcement of the permit system.51 Although no such strike
eventuated, by January 1947, only 30'/. of permit holders had
applied tor the renewal of permits. This strengthened Language's
resolve to prosecute 64 residents who had failed to renew their
ipermits.52 The pending evictions throughout 1947 meant that the
location was enveloped in an atmosphere of sullen hostility
towards the council and Language. Not only was the measure in
itself offensive to location organisations, but they were
outraged that it had br?en reintroduced without consultation with
the Advisory Board.33 To make matters worse, location residents
'were well aware that Brakpan was the only municipality on the
reef which continued to enforce a residential permit system in
the late 1940s. Elsewhere, because of the acute housing
shortages, the .municipalities adhered to the resolution of the
Association of Administrators of Non-European Affairs not. to take
any steps against Africans who lived in the location of one
municipal area but who worked in another.54
In February 1947, Bopape and a deputation of Advisory Board and
Vigilance Association members went to see the Native Commissioner
in Benoni. They hoped to persuade him and the Department of
Native Affairs to intervene in the matter and to press the
council into allowing persons employed in other towns to remain
in their homes in the Brakpan Location. They detailed the
hardships caused by the manager's intransigence and appealed to
the Commissioner to intercede in the matter.55 The deputation
found a sympathetic audience in this official as he was well
aware of the acute housing shortages on the Reef. His own appeals
to the council to relax the regulation, however, fell on deaf
50 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Location Superintendent to the Manager
of Non-European Affairs, 13 December, 1946
51 BMAsBMR 14/7/7 Native Commissioner, Benoni to the Town
Clerk, 28 January, 1947
52 BMAsBMR 14/7/7 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the
Native Commissioner, Benoni, 20 January, 1948
53 BMA:BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory
Board, 13 February, 1947
54 BMA:BMR 14/7/7 Minutes of the Meeting of the Finances
and General Purposes Committee, 17 May, .1.948
55 BMAsBMR 14/7/7 Native Commissioner, Benoni to the Town
Clerk, 25 February, 1947
ears and prosecutions continued unabated.56
The failure of the Native Commissioner and the Advisory Hoard's
efforts- to persuade the council to desist from prosecutions
decided location leaders that more forceful measures would be
required. They accordingly mounted an anti-permit campaign which
was to continue through to 1948. There were two components of
their strategy. Firstly they enlisted the legal help of Senator
Basner and Lewis Baker (a Benoni lawyer and prominent member of
the CPSA East Rand branch) to approach the government and to
defend residents in court. Secondly, they dispatched letters of
protest to the press, council, Native Commissioner and Minister
of Native Affairs. The legal battles in the courts proved to be
the less effective of the two strategies as residents frequently
lost cases in the courts on fine points of law.57
In their letters to the minister, the Location Joint
Organisations Committee detailed the hardships of "decent
workers" who were being harassed and prosecuted by the council.
The Committee wrote that Africans had invested great, hopes in the
Fagan Commission and in the speculations that the government
intended improving the conditions of urban Africans. The Brakpan
Town Council's policies, they wrote, made such "promises" appear
hollow, for at precisely this moment of hope for Africans
countrywide, .they were being subjected to measures which were
"contrary to all principles of justice and humanity" and had
caused "immeasurable misery and sufferings".58 Such appeals,
together with stinging attacks on the Brakpan Town Council made
in the liberal press caused the Department acute discomfort.59
The Secretary for Native Affairs attempted to urge the council to
adopt a more flexible approach to the implementation of
regulations and to conform to the general trend on the Rand of
accommodating workers who lived in other Reef towns until such
time as departmental clarity on issues such as influx and pass
controls had been reached. In view of the general housing
shortage, he argued, it was not practicable to apply that
section of the 1945 Urban Areas Act which empowered the local
authority to remove Africans not employed within the urban area.
No precipitate action should be taken prior to the release of the
56 BMArBMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting' of the Advisory
Board, 15 October, 1947
57 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the
Native Commissioner, Benoni, 20 January, 1948
58 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Secretary, Brakpan Location Joint
Organisations Committee to the Administrator, 1
October, 1947
59 Rand Daily Mail. 6 October, 1947
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findings of the Fagan Commision.60
By this time, Language was highly irritated by vlie
representations of both the residents and the Department. He was
convinced that the groundswell of resistance to the permits had
originated in the agitation of "a few communists" who had based
their grievances on "falsehoods" and was satisfied that the
policy was being applied in an "efficient and reasonable manner."
He responded sharply with the reply that by law, (the Natives
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945), he, was compelled to
execute the statutory functions placed upon him and that nobody,
not even the Department of Native Affairs could instruct him not
to carry out duties laid down by the law. The act left no room
for administrative discretion, he said and he was persuaded that
•the only means of solving the local housing crisis was through
the implementation of the permit system. The government's
responsibility in turn, one which it had shirked, was to prevent
the influx of Africans from the rural areas.61 The prosecutions
thus continued unabated throughout the remainder of 1947 and
1948.
Both the inflexibility of Language and the Department of Native
Affairs' desire to "soft pedal" the whole permit issue is best
understood within the context of the growing politicisation of
location issues and the bitter struggles which had emerged
between the town council and Advisory Board over the role and
"powers" of the Advisory Board. It was these struggles which
really brought about the final, undignified denouement in the
Bopape - Language story. It is thus to these issues that this
paper now turns.
Advisory Board - Town Council Relations. 1944 - 194B
One of the major demands of the 1944 stay away had been for
greater decision making powers for the Advisory Board. Indeed
throughout the decade, location leaders had been calling for an
"own treasury" and for direct representation on the town council.
A major cause of resentment was the impotence of the Board and
its dominance by the manager and council members. It has be^n
mentioned that the CPSA viewed the Advisory Board system as
useful in garnering support bases in locations and in acquiring a
position of leverage in bargaining with tht? loi-iai authorities. In
Brakpan, this strategy had been effectively put into practice, so
60 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Native Commissioner, Benoni to the Town
Clerk, 21 October, 1947
61 BMArBMR 14/7/7 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the"
Town Clark, 7 February, 1948; CAD:NTS- 4320 J.79/313
Secretary for Native Affairs to the Director of Native
Labour, 21 October, 1947
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much so that this "dummy" institutions much reviled by Youth
Leaguers and the national ANC body, had succeeded in developing a
genuinely popular standing in this community. It was seen to
relay demands of residents to the council and to report back
religiously to its constituents on the progress of its
negotiations with the council. It also, on occasion was
successful in mobilising the entire location around specific
campaigns such as the boycott of the municipal bus in 1946.
It was not only the CF:'SA which was alerted to the politicising
and mobilising potential of the Advisory Board. Both its
potential to organise the community around particular campaigns •
and its demands for greater powers of decision making was viewed
with unease by Dr Language. Thus, in the aftermath of the stay-
away, along with his determination to stifle the CPSA and ANC in
the location, went the resolve to bring the Advisory Board to
heel. This took, the form of attempts to discredit the Board in
the eyes of the Department of Native Affairs and to fight for the
diminution of the Board's already limited "powers".
Between 1944 and 1947, tension between the Board and Language was
acute. The tension was fuelled by conflicting perceptions of the
situation. The Board felt frustrated that none of the grievances
around living . conditions, educational facilities, housing
shortages, bus fares and rentals were addressed by the council,
while Language and his colleagues believed that these grievances
had been exaggerated by communist Advisory Board members for
reasons of political expediency. These different perceptions
meant that an atmosphere of profound mistrust existed between the
council and the Board. The first major clash between the Advisory
Board on the one hand and Language and the Council on the other
occurred in 1945. In this year, the Department of Native Affairs
announced its intentions of extending powers to the Advisory
Boards in accordance with the provisions of Act 46 of 1944, which
would give them a greater say in the disposal of location
revenue. It would mean that Advisory Boards as well as town
councils would now be required to submit their views on financial
estimates for "native administration" to the Secretary for Native
Affairs.62 It was a proposal which left Language and his
Department aghast. In a meeting with the Minister of Native
Affairs in April, 1945, Language and his deputation gave vent to
their frustration with the entire system of Advisory Boards and
to their fears of seeing any augmentation of power to these
institutions. The deputation told the minister, that while the
Advisory Board members were urbanised, they were not
"sufficiently developed to have a clear insight into and
understanding of technical matters like financial issues and
statutory regulations, with the result that they are easily
prejudiced and either wasted precious time with unnecessary
62 Brakpan Herald, 20 April, 1945
argument or refuse altogether to co-operate". Moreover, they
asserted, Advisory Board members were politically .immature,
simply "not ready for democratic: representation of the western
European type" because they displayed an "overrsadiness to ..,
accept without question anyone posing as a leader, especially one
with anti-European sentiments". This propensity, they believed,
had led to communist control of the Board. The Department's
proposal, they opined, would bring the council under the control
of the Advisory Board, which given its technical incompetence and
political credulity, • would be "most undignified and
embarrassing".63 In the council's view, Advisory Boards "were
intended to be and should remain subsidiary to the Town councils
who B.rs responsible controlling bodies of urban locations". As
if realising that bombast was not enough, the deputation fell
' back on the law, arguing that the Department's latest requirement
had no legal standing. According to the Act, they submitted,
reports of the Board should be considered by local authorities;
and not by the Department.
As in the permit controversy, Language's arguments carried the
day and Language remained convinced that consultation with the
Advisory Boards over location spending was unnecessary and
undesirable. Accordingly, in the following year, when the
beerhall profits were used by the council for cleaning and
tarring the location streets and for debiting the lasses an a new
housing scheme, the council did not see fit to inform the
Advisory Board beforehand of its intentions.
The comments made by the deputation to the Minister soon reached
the ears of the Board members, as the discussions were widely
reported in the Brakpan Herald and B.§rii.____P_aiJLy_ Ji§i-~' Not
suprisingly, the news of this interview aroused widespread anger.
The depiction of the Board as incapable of understanding
financial and technical matters and as a coterie of misguided
communists raised a storm of protest in the location. Mass
meetings were summoned, indignant letters were sent to the press,
council and Department of Native Affairs protesting against the
attack on the integrity of the Board and in defence of the
institution as useful and valuable to urban African
communities.64 A secondary controversy raged over the council's
diversion of beerhall funds into street cleaning, which together
with anger against the Council's insulting depiction of the
Board, once again prompted central government intervention, The
Department announced that beerhall funds should no longer be u<•><:>d
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far such purposes.65
Relations between the council and Board reached breaking point in
the following year. This was partly because it was a year of
accelerated political activity in which Board members were seen
to be major actors. Anti-pass struggles were renewed in this year
following Bopaspe's suggestion at the Anti - Pass Conference of
the ANC in Johannesburg that a "mass struggle" commence in June
and culminate in a national stoppage of work and the burning of
passes.66 In the context of dissatisfaction over the permit
system, the anti-pass call in June evoked an immediate response
in the location. The central role played by the Advisory Board in
hosting the meetings and marches and its relentless criticisms of
the council led to a renewed attack on the Advisory Board in
August. In a "Statement to the Advisory Board", councillor Davey
mads a blistering attack on the "Advisory Board members for
hosting of political meetings, for sending streams of letters to
the press and government and for organising boycotts of council -
called meetings, The "statement" concluded with the threat that
"serious consequences" would follow if the Board continued in its
obstructionism.67 The "statement" by Councillor Davey was
followed by a similar "statement" to the location's churchmen,
who, it was alleged, had become "instruments or cat's paws of ...
movements whose principles clash with those of the churches" and
with the intimidation of politically active residents. In the
following month, the council took steps to control open air
meetings. From this time, persons wishing to hold meetings in the
location were to give the council 24 hours notice of their
intentions.68
In the hopes of resolving what had become a deadlock, the
Advisory Board approached the Native Commissioner of Benoni, By
this date, the Department had become seriously alarmed by the
letters of complaints and the Native Commissioner thus agreed to
meet a deputation on the 23 September which laid all their
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complaints against Language and his department before him. After
the meeting, the Native Commissioner concluded that the
residents' hostility was indeed "natural", given the harshness of
the location'administration. He noted that a "more tolerant and
sympathetic attitude" on the council's behalf would bfc>
"beneficial". He informed the Director 'of Native Labour that he
believed that there was insufficient consultation with the
• Advisory Board and that "understandable" frustration had arisen
as a consequence. The meeting, however, did little to improve
communication between the council and the Board. Attitudes
hardened,; and communication between the two bodies all but broke
down. All the other organisations in the location shared the view
of the Board, that the tensions had been caused by the "hostile
attitude" of the location officials, particularly Language and
his superintendent who "treated Africans as "kaffirs" to he put,
in their place, rather than as human beings who contributed to
the prosperity of Brakpan."69
In the following year, with the opening of the anti-permit
campaign, the council alienated itself even further from the
location inhabitants when it forced Bopape and fellow communist
and ANC Advisory Board member, Mr Nchabaleng to resign for the
Board. Bopape was1forced to resign on the grounds that as he was
no longer a registered occupier of a house in the location (he
was no longer employed in Brakpan - by this time he was working
as full time secretary of the Transvaal ANC) and Nchabaleng on
the grounds that strictly speaking, teachers were not eligible to
serve on Advisory Boards. This action, however was seen by most
residents as an unequivocal attempt to silence location
leadership.
Despite the council's efforts to' push men like Bopape and
Nchabaleng out of Advisory Board politics and their assertion
that the communist members of the Advisory Board did not enjoy
real support, in the October elections of that year, Bopape,
Gideon Ngake and Efraim Pakade, all CPSA and ANC members, swept
the polls.70 Under their leadership, the campaign for the removal
of Language was. intensified, as was the struggle against the
permit system. Language had by now lost all patience; any trivial
matter would now trigger his temper.
Towards the end of October 1947, a special meeting of the new
Advisory Board was convened to discuss additional expenditure
from the Native Revenue Account. Bopape proposed that the im-jetn ICJ
be postponed in order to allow the members sufficient timii in
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which they could study the proposed expenses. The proposal was
seconded and passed. As the meeting was being closed, an angered
1.)r Language left the Advisory Board room,7i According to the
testimony given by Bopape and Pakade in court, the two of them
left the room minutes later. As they passed by the location
offices where Language was standing, he allegedly called out to
Bopape, "Jou verdomdE? Kaffir". As Bopape told the court
"He looked at me as he said it and when
I kept, quiet, he repeated the remark.
I replied that the Manager is an important
official of the town council and should not
use obscene language, He replied, "Ek sal
vir jou wys kaffir"... He then landed a blow
with his right fist in my left eye....I
retreated and he advanced on me and struck
me a second blow with his right fist on my
right temple. I resisted pushing him backj
with my fists. At that stage, the superin-
tendent came and caught hold of Dr Language.
We were then separated and Pakade got hold
of me and the superintendent got hold of the
accused and we were separated."72
The matter ended in the magistrate's court in which Language was
found guilty of assault. He then took the case on appeal, but the
appeal was dismissed with costs and Language was compelled to pay
L28 damages to Bopape.73 Not surprisingly, this latest
development in the Brakpan saga alarmed the Department of Native
Affairs which opened a fresh investigation into Language's
conduct. After reviewing the history of his administration and
the events leading up to the assault on Bopape, the Department
concluded rather mildly that Language indeed had been lacking "in
dignity in dealing with Bopape". However, they decided, "in the
circumstances", the removal of either Bopape or Language would
have "serious repercussions amongst the European and Native
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public,"74
Language was thus retained as manager, a posit.ion he was to
occupy until i960 when he left the municipality to take up a
chair in anthropology at the University of the Orange Free; State,
In the last years of the 1940s, he succeeded in expelling much of
the • "surplus" population of the location through the permit
system. Political and social controls were introduced through
overnight permits, curfew bells and tighter policing. Indeed, as
one journalist claimed, by the end of the decade, Language had
succeeded in making the Brakpan Location "een van die makste in
die land".75 Later events however, would prove this pronouncement
to be inaccurate, as in the following decade, the Brakpan
Location was to become one of the most active ANC centres on the
'Witwatersrand and the scene of renewed acts of insurgency.
In the 1950s, Language was to enjoy acclaim as an administrator.
He was one of the founder members of the Association of
Administrators of Non-European Affairs of Southern Africa and
president of this professional- association in 1956. He was also
on the examination board of the Association. Throughout his life,
he sustained an unbroken membership Qf SABRA and in 1974, was
honoured by this organisation when he was made honorary president
in recognition of his contribution. In these years, Language
published several articles and gave speeches on urban
administration, a field in which he was regarded as one of the
country's experts. The establishment of Tsakane township in 1959,
the new "apartheid" township for Brakpan was seen as the crowning
achievement of his period as Manager of non-European Affairs. In
1960s after seventeen years service, he took up the position as
Professor of Anthropology at the University of the Orange Free
State, He was an esteemed and respected teacher and played a
signficant role there in the promotion of research. He retired in
1975 and went to live at the Strand with his wife, until his
death in 1981.
Bopape's political career was a less auspicious one in the years
that followed his assault by Language. After his dismissal from
the Amalgamated Mission School, 1944 Eiopape took up the full time
position as Transvaal secretary of the ANC. He travelled
frequently throughout, the province in this capacity, Bopape's
political career was to be cut short five years later in l'i>52,
the year of the Defiance Campaign. In May that year, before the
opening of the Campaign, ha was banned together with J.B, Marks
and Moses Kotane and compelled to resign from all poliI .real
organisations. Henceforth, he would have to watch the major
74 CAD:NTS 4320 179/313 Native Commissioner Benuni to the
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political upheavals of the succeeding decades from a distance and
reconstruct a life outside of politics.
Cone 1usion
This paper has attempted to examine the impact and contribution
of two key figures in urban policy-making and political circles
in the 1940s. While the stature and importance of both men in
their respective communities is undeniable, it may be necessary
briefly to reinsert them into the worlds that shaped their ideas
and actions.
Attention has already been devoted to Langauge's formative years
in Stellenbosch. The environment and social world he inhabited in
Brakpan was probably as important an influence in the formation
of his policies. Although it is tempting to characterise Language
as an arch ideological zealot, the sometimes extreme actions
which he took in Brakpan were wholly endorsed by the council, and
by implication too, by the broader white constituency. As has
been suggested, the local white populace, probably more than any
other on the East Rand shared the perceptions of Language with
regard to African urbanisation and the threats that this posed to
the town's social order. He was also thus a man of his time and
his place.
Similar comments may be made about. Bopape, His energy, commitment
and persuasiveness Bre likewise undeniable. Informants all
testified to the strength of his personality and to the sustained
leadership position he enjoyed in the location. But he too was
profoundly affected by his environment and his age. Like Bopape,
an entire generation of African politicians were roused by the
democratic ideals espoused in the war years and were inspired by
the spontaneous ferment within the squatter camps, locations and
the mines. Bopape15 methods of harnessing this militancy was
similarly not unique. His advocation of using "dummy
institutions" to further "the struggle" and his commitment to
fighting both local struggles as well as national political
struggles, for example, was echoed throughout the region. Indeed,
the East Rand locations of Payneville, Germiston and Heidelburg
witnessed similar trajectories of struggle and threw up similar
local politicians committed to grassroots mobilisation as a means
of drawing their constituencies into the larger political fray.
Bopape moreover was not the only local politician of note in
Brakpan. The careers of men such as Pakade, Nchabaleng and Ngake,
all CPSA and ANC leaders who participated in local and Advisory
Board politics echo Bopape's experience and political
development.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
